Good quote that you can relate to from your own arguments, regarding the structural working of a centralized economy-
applicable to health care or anything centrally managed:

(“lower order” refers to consumer level, and “higher order”
production level.)

Every man who, in the course of economic life, takes a choice between the
satisfaction of one need as against another, eo ipso makes a judgment of value.
Such judgments of value at once include only the very satisfaction of the need
itself; and from this they reflect back upon the goods of a lower, and then further
upon goods of a higher order.2 As a rule, the man who knows his own mind is in
a position to value goods of a lower order. Under simple conditions it is also
possible for him without much ado to form some judgment of the significance to
him of goods of a higher order. But where the state of affairs is more involved
and their interconnections not so easily discernible, subtler means must be
employed to accomplish a correct(3) valuation of the means of production. It would
not be difficult for a farmer in economic isolation to come by a distinction
between the expansion of pasture-farming and the development of activity in the
hunting field. In such a case the processes of production involved are relatively
short and the expense and income entailed can be easily gauged. But it is quite a
different matter when the choice lies between the utilization of a water-course for
the manufacture of electricity or the extension of a coal mine or the drawing up
of plans for the better employment of the energies latent in raw coal. Here the
roundabout processes of production are many and each is very lengthy; here the
conditions necessary for the success of the enterprises which are to be initiated
are diverse, so that one cannot apply merely vague valuations, but requires rather
more exact estimates and some judgment of the economic issues actually
involved.
Valuation can only take place in terms of units, yet it is impossible that there
should ever be a unit of subjective use value for goods. Marginal utility does not
posit any unit of value, since it is obvious that the value of two units of a given
stock is necessarily greater than, but less than double, the value of a single unit.
(“lower order” refers to consumer level, and “higher order”
production level.)
(3 Using that term, of course, in the sense only of the valuating subject, and not in an objective and
universally applicable sense.)

Judgments of value do not measure; they merely establish grades and scales.
Even Robinson Crusoe, when he has to make a decision where no ready
judgment of value appears and where he has to construct one upon the basis of a
more or less exact estimate, cannot operate solely with subjective use value, but
must take into consideration the intersubstitutability of goods on the basis of
which he can then form his estimates. In such circumstances it will be impossible
for him to refer all things back to one unit. Rather will he, so far as he can, refer
all the elements which have to be taken into account in forming his estimate to
those economic goods which can be apprehended by an obvious judgment of
value--that is to say, to goods of a lower order and to pain-cost. That this is only
possible in very simple conditions is obvious. In the case of more complicated
and more lengthy processes of production it will, plainly, not answer.
In an exchange economy the objective exchange value of commodities enters
as the unit of economic calculation. This entails a threefold advantage. In the first
place, it renders it possible to base the calculation upon the valuations of all
participants in trade. The subjective use value of each is not immediately
comparable as a purely individual phenomenon with the subjective use value of
other men. It only becomes so in exchange value, whic h arises out of the
interplay of the subjective valuations of all who take part in exchange. But in that
case calculation by exchange value furnishes a control over the appropriate
employment of goods. Anyone who wishes to make calculations in regard to a
complicated process of production will immediately notice whether he has
worked more economically than others or not; if he finds, from reference to the
exchange relations obtaining in the market, that he will not be able to produce
profitably, this shows that others understand how to make a better use of the
goods of higher order in question. Lastly, calculation by exchange value makes it
possible to refer values back to a unit. For this purpose, since goods are mutually
substitutable in accordance with the exchange relations obtaining in the market,
any possible good can be chosen. In a monetary economy it is money that is so
chosen.
Monetary calculation has its limits. Money is no yardstick of value, nor yet of
price. Value is not indeed measured in money, nor is price. They merely consist
in money. Money as an economic good is not of stable value as has been naïvely,
but wrongly, assumed in using it as a “standard of deferred payments.” The
exchange-relationship which obtains between money and goods is subjected to
constant, if (as a rule) not too violent, fluctuations originating not only from the
side of other economic goods, but also from the side of money. However, these

fluctuations disturb value calculations only in the slightest degree, since usually,
in view of the ceaseless alternations in other economic data--these calculations
will refer only to comparatively short periods of time--periods in which “good”
money, at least normally, undergoes comparatively trivial fluctuations in regard
to its exchange relations. The inadequacy of the monetary calculation of value
does not have its mainspring in the fact that value is then calculated in terms of a
universal medium of exchange, namely money, but rather in the fact that in this
system it is exchange value and not subjective use value on which the calculation
is based. It can never obtain as a measure for the calculation of those value
determining elements which stand outside the domain of exchange transactions.
If, for example, a man were to calculate the profitability of erecting a
waterworks, he would not be able to include in his calculation the beauty of the
waterfall which the scheme might impair, except that he may pay attention to the
diminution of tourist traffic or similar changes, which may be valued in terms of
money. Yet these considerations might well prove one of the factors in deciding
whether or not the building is to go up at all.
It is customary to term such elements “extra-economic.” This perhaps is
appropriate; we are not concerned with disputes over terminology; yet the
considerations themselves can scarcely be termed irrational. In any place where
men regard as significant the beauty of a neighborhood or of a building, the
health, happiness and contentment of mankind, the honor of individuals or
nations, they are just as much motive forces of rational conduct as are economic
factors in the proper sense of the word, even where they are not substitutable
against each other on the market and therefore do not enter into exchange
relationships.
That monetary calculation cannot embrace these factors lies in its very nature;
but for the purposes of our everyday economic life this does not detract from the
significance of monetary calculation. For all those ideal goods are goods of a
lower order, and can hence be embraced straightway within the ambit of our
judgment of values. There is therefore no difficulty in taking them into account,
even though they must remain outside the sphere of monetary value. That they do
not admit of such computation renders their consideration in the affairs of life
easier and not harder. Once we see clearly how highly we value beauty, health,
honor and pride, surely nothing can prevent us from paying a corresponding
regard to them. It may seem painful to any sensitive spirit to have to balance
spiritual goods against material. But that is not the fault of monetary calculation;
it lies in the very nature of things themselves. Even where judgments of value
can be established directly without computation in value or in money, the
necessity of choosing between material and spiritual satisfaction cannot be evaded. Robinson Crusoe and the socialist
state have an equal obligation to make the choice.

For who could be free when every other man's humour might domineer over him? - John Locke (2nd Treatise, sect 57)